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NOTE
Missed the Mark: The Supreme Court of
Missouri’s Faulty Application of Strict
Scrutiny to the Right to Bear Arms
State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)
Abigail E. Williams*

I. INTRODUCTION
The discussion of the scope and potential limitations of the Second
Amendment has been at the forefront of the United States’s political debate in
recent years. Prior to 2008, Second Amendment jurisprudence was unclear as
to what could constitute a lawful restriction of an individual’s right to bear
arms.1 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller,
affirmed the Second Amendment guarantee of the right to bear arms, holding
that a Washington, D.C., law that prohibited possessing handguns in the home
was unconstitutional.2 The Court further indicated that nothing in the opinion
“should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”3 Two
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the right to bear arms was fundamental and applied to the states.4 While Heller
and McDonald made clear that the Second Amendment was a limited fundamental right, neither decision defined the applicable constitutional standard for
analyzing laws restricting the right to bear arms.5
In 2014, Missouri amended its constitution to include Amendment 5, a
provision that requires the application of strict scrutiny to any law limiting the
right to bear arms.6 In a sequence of cases, the last of which was State v. Clay,
*

B.A., University of Kansas, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2018; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. I would like to thank
Professor Rodney Uphoff for his guidance and suggestions, the editors of the Missouri
Law Review for their time and assistance, my mom for her listening ear and feedback
at the beginning of the writing process, and my husband for his unwavering support.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008).
2. Id. at 630.
3. Id. at 626–27.
4. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
5. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786.
6. Following the adoption of Amendment 5, article I, section 23 states:
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the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section 571.070.1(1), a law that
prohibited felons from possessing firearms, survived strict scrutiny.7 In so
holding, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on the Heller dicta, even though
the Heller Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard.8 This Note argues
the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in its application of strict scrutiny. While
it is difficult to measure the efficacy of gun control laws, it is evident that categorically and permanently banning felons from possessing firearms is not the
least restrictive means of achieving the government’s safety interest.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On January 26, 2015, Pierre Clay was stopped in St. Louis, Missouri, for
a traffic violation and found possessing a revolver.9 The police discovered he
had a prior felony conviction and arrested him.10 On February 25, 2015, Clay
was charged by information with possession of marijuana under section
195.202 and unlawful possession of a firearm under section 571.070.1(1).11
Section 571.070.1(1) prohibits previously convicted felons from possessing
firearms.12 Clay moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, claiming

That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home,
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil
power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable.
Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny and the
state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall under
no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those
adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result of a mental
disorder or mental infirmity.

MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (new language in bold, deleted language struck
through).
7. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); State v. Merritt, 467
S.W.3d 808, 816 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892,
897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo.
2015) (en banc).
8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
9. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 533.
10. Id.
11. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 571.070.1(1), 195.202 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
12. Id. § 571.070.1(1). The statute states:
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person
knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch person has
been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the
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that section 571.070.1(1) was unconstitutional under article I, section 23 of the
Missouri Constitution, after Amendment 5 was added on August 5, 2014.13
Clay claimed that article I, section 23, as amended, precluded the legislature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons.14 He argued that the Missouri Constitution’s explicit authorization of the legislature
to regulate the possession of firearms by violent felons should be read to preclude the legislature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent
felons.15 Further, Clay asserted that Amendment 5 substantially changed article I, section 23.16 Therefore, he argued the precedent that deemed section
571.070.1(1) constitutional under the pre-Amendment 5 version of article I,
section 23 should not be applied to his case.17
The circuit court granted Clay’s motion to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, determining that Amendment 5 barred the legislature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons.18 The State appealed.19
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Amendment 5 did not substantially
alter article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, and, therefore, the
court’s precedent which held that section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict scrutiny
remained applicable to this case.20

laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state,
would be a felony . . . .

Id.
13. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 533. Following the adoption of Amendment 5, article I,
section 23 states:
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home,
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil
power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable.
Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny and the
state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall under
no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those
adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result of a mental
disorder or mental infirmity.

MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (new language in bold, deleted language struck
through).
14. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 534.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 536.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 533.
19. Id. at 532.
20. Id. at 538.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section
571.070.1(1) was constitutional under the amended version of article I, section
23 of the Missouri Constitution.21 The pertinent part of section 571.070.1(1)
states:
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such
person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch
person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of
a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if
22
committed within this state, would be a felony[.]

Following the adoption of Amendment 5,23 article I, section 23 of the Missouri
Constitution states:
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and
accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense
of his home, person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned
in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. The rights guaranteed by this
section shall be unalienable. Any restriction on these rights shall
24
be subject to strict scrutiny[ ] and the state of Missouri shall be
obligated to uphold these rights and shall under no circumstances
decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or

21. Id.
22. Id. at 533 (alterations in original) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1)

(Cum. Supp. 2013)).
23. Amendment 5 of article I, section 26 was adopted on August 5, 2014. MO.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014).
24. Strict scrutiny is considered the “most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.” Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)). If a classification is subject to
strict scrutiny, the court must determine whether it is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d
771, 774 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (per curiam). See also State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d
892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814
(Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“[S]trict scrutiny is generally satisfied only if the
law at issue is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 197)). If other, less restrictive, means can serve
the compelling interest equally, the more restrictive means will be unnecessary and,
therefore, unconstitutional. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 1443, 1465 (2009).
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those adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result
25
of a mental disorder or mental infirmity.

In reaching its decision in Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to bear arms in both District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, as well as recent
Supreme Court of Missouri decisions interpreting these U.S. Supreme Court
cases. Accordingly, this Part examines the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of article I, section 23 within the framework of McDonald and Heller.
This Part concludes with a comparison of other states’ evaluations of firearm
regulations post-Heller and McDonald to Missouri’s.

A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Right to Bear Arms
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined a
District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home
was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.26 In an opinion authored
by Justice Scalia, the Court held, “The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition
of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society
for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”27 The Court
did not apply a specific level of scrutiny, noting that “banning from the home
‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of
one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster” under any standard
of scrutiny.28 More important for the problems confronted in Clay was the
Heller Court’s dicta, which stated that nothing in the opinion “should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sen-

25. MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (emphasis added) (new language in
bold, deleted language struck through).
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,
400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
28. Id. at 628–29 (citation omitted) (quoting Parker, 478 F.3d at 400). In response
to Justice Breyer’s dissent, the Court later rejected both rational basis scrutiny and interest balancing. Id. at 628 n.27, 634. Thus, possible applicable constitutional standards include intermediate and strict scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny allows restrictions
that are substantially related to important governmental interests. Volokh, supra note
24, at 1470. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478
(1989). As addressed above, strict scrutiny allows restrictions that are narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling government interest. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467
S.W.3d at 814.
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sitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”29 According to the
Court, each of these regulations was “presumptively lawful.”30
In his dissent, Justice Breyer admonished the majority for its deliberate
silence regarding the proper constitutional standard to evaluate laws under the
Second Amendment.31 The dissenting opinion explored some of the possible
constitutional standards.32 First, Justice Breyer opined that a rational basis
standard was inconsistent with the majority’s holding because the District of
Columbia law undoubtedly bore “a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate governmental purpose.’”33 Next, he determined that a strict scrutiny standard was
also inconsistent with the majority’s holding.34 He asserted that the majority
“implicitly, and appropriately,” rejected strict scrutiny by broadly approving a
set of laws, including “forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right
. . . whose constitutionality under a strict-scrutiny standard would be far from
clear.”35 He not only determined that the majority’s dicta was inconsistent with
strict scrutiny, but also that the adoption of a true strict scrutiny standard for
evaluating firearm regulations would be practically impossible.36

29. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. This dicta clearly departs from Scalia’s notorious
originalist interpretation of the Constitution and may have been inserted specifically to
secure a fifth vote to gain the majority. See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of
Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 420 (2009) (asserting that the language
was “clearly tacked on to the opinion to secure a fifth vote (presumably Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s)”).
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28, 628 n.27.
31. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 687–89.
33. Id. at 687–88 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). According
to Justice Breyer, the government’s interest was to save lives and prevent gun-related
accidents. Id. He noted that the District of Columbia law at least bore a “‘rational
relationship’ to that ‘legitimate’ life-saving objective.” Id. at 688. Responding to Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that the District of Columbia law, like most
laws, would survive rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 628–29, 629 n.27 (majority opinion).
He wrote, “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a
rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. at 629 n.27.
34. Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 688.
36. Id. at 689. He noted that every gun-control regulation will seek to advance a
compelling government interest – a concern for the safety and the lives of its citizens.
Id. Therefore, “any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in
practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the
other.” Id. Ultimately, Justice Breyer concluded that the Court should adopt this interest-balancing inquiry explicitly. Id.
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Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, petitioners filed suit
against the city, alleging that its handgun ban violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.37 Relying on the Heller decision, the McDonald Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates to the states the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms for self-defense against the several states and
any city therein.38 The Court determined that the Heller decision indicated the
right to bear arms was “fundamental” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and was therefore incorporated in the concept of due process.39 Like in Heller, the Court did not define a specific constitutional standard to evaluate laws limiting the right to bear arms.40 Further, McDonald affirmed the Heller dicta regarding the presumed lawfulness of certain regulations, noting that “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”41

B. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Reliance on the Heller and
McDonald Precedent
State v. Clay was preceded by four different Supreme Court of Missouri
decisions that relied on Heller and McDonald.42 First, State v. Richard was
decided after Heller but before McDonald.43 In Richard, the Supreme Court
of Missouri determined that a law which forbade the possession or discharge
of a firearm while intoxicated was constitutional under article I, section 23 of
the Missouri Constitution.44 The Supreme Court of Missouri did not define a
specific constitutional standard but merely noted that the legislature was afforded “wide discretion to exercise its police power,” and “[p]ossession of a
loaded firearm by an intoxicated individual poses a demonstrated threat to public safety.”45

37. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010).
38. Id. at 767.
39. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The Court

did not indicate that strict scrutiny must be applied for laws challenged under a provision that includes a fundamental right. Id. at 768. The Court discussed whether the
right to keep and bear arms is fundamental solely for the purpose of determining
whether the right is incorporated in the concept of due process. Id. at 767.
40. Id. at 767.
41. Id. at 786.
42. See supra note 7.
43. State v. Richard, 298 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
44. Id. at 531–33. This was decided under the pre-Amendment 5 version of article
I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, which provided as follows: “That the right
of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or
when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this
shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended
2014).
45. Richard, 298 S.W.3d at 532.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Fischer wrote that the Second Amendment was a fundamental right that applied to the states, “even though the
United States Supreme Court ha[d] yet to make that declaration.”46 Despite his
declaration that the right to bear arms was “fundamental,” Judge Fischer did
not declare strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard that should apply when
evaluating restrictions on the Second Amendment.47 Instead, he alluded to the
Heller Court’s dicta and wrote that “reasonable limitations on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill and laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings,” were
constitutional.48
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not decide another right to bear arms
case until 2015, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s McDonald decision.49 In Dotson v. Kander, the plaintiffs argued that the ballot title for Amendment 5 of
article I, section 23 was legally insufficient because it omitted any description
of the language concerning strict scrutiny and failed to inform the voter that
the amendment substantially changed the laws regulating the right to bear
arms.50 In Dotson, the court determined that Amendment 5 “did not change
the law affecting the right to bear arms but established a broader guideline indicating how laws affecting the right to bear arms should be scrutinized.”51
According to the Dotson court, after McDonald, the strict scrutiny standard
was applicable to restrictions on the right to bear arms, even before the passage
of Amendment 5.52
The Dotson court determined that the McDonald Court’s holding that the
right to bear arms was fundamental meant that strict scrutiny should be applied
to any law challenged under article I, section 23.53 In so holding, the Dotson
court relied on Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Services, Inc., in which
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that fundamental rights, such as “the rights
to free speech, to vote, [and] to freedom of interstate travel,” are subject to
strict scrutiny.54 The Etling court defined the strict scrutiny standard as requiring a law to be “necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.”55 While
this definition of strict scrutiny differs from the traditional definition used by

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 533 (Fischer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 534.
Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 197 n.5.
Id.
Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo.
2003) (en banc) (per curiam).
55. Id.
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the U.S. Supreme Court,56 the Supreme Court of Missouri seems to use these
two different articulations of the test interchangeably. The court later defined
strict scrutiny as the determination of whether a law is “narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.”57
The two Dotson concurring opinions shed further light on the possible
impact of Amendment 5.58 Judge Fischer noted that the purpose of the amendment was “not to change the law but to make sure the Missouri Constitution is
at least as protective as the Supreme Court of the United States has declared
the law of the right to bear arms is under the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”59 Judge Stith asserted that, within the meaning of
Amendment 5, strict scrutiny does not require “utilization of a technical legal
standard that even the United States Supreme Court does not apply to regulation of the Second Amendment.”60 She further avowed that adoption of the
technical definition of “strict scrutiny” would “impinge on the judicial province
and so raise serious separation of powers issues.”61
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State v. McCoy and
State v. Merritt.62 These were companion cases decided on the same day, as
both challenged the constitutionality of section 571.070.1(1) under article I,
section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.63 The court in McCoy and Merritt
determined that the amended version of article I, section 23 was not applicable
because the amendment was not yet in effect at the time of the offenses.64 The
court held that, according to the Dotson decision, strict scrutiny applied under
56. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (defining
the use of strict scrutiny as reviewing a law with care to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest” (quoting Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997))).
57. See State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)
(noting that strict scrutiny is only satisfied if the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en
banc) (per curiam) (same).
58. Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 200–05 (Fischer, J., concurring); id. at 205–15 (Stith,
J., concurring).
59. Id. at 200 (Fischer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 209 (Stith, J., concurring). It should also be noted that Judge Teitelman
authored an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in the separate opinion
filed in which he determined that Amendment 5 did substantially alter article I, section
23, and the summary statement on the ballot failed to reflect these changes. Id. at 215–
21 (Teitelman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part in separate opinion filed).
61. Id. at 209 (Stith, J., concurring).
62. State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v.
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
63. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 894; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 810.
64. See McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895; see also Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812. The
court wrote, “The amended version of article I, section 23 does not have any text that
suggests it was intended to be applied retroactively. Therefore, it applies prospectively
only.” Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812. See also McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895 (citing State
ex rel. Hall v. Vaughn, 483 S.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Mo. 1972) (en banc)).
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both the amended and previous versions of article I, section 23.65 The court
determined that section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict scrutiny because it was
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”66
The court in Merritt and McCoy relied on a Third Circuit case that determined “[i]t is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent
crimes than are other law abiding citizens.”67 Further, the court quoted a Seventh Circuit case in which the court determined that “someone with a felony
conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and
violent gun use.”68 However, neither the Third Circuit nor the Seventh Circuit
implied that a law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was narrowly
tailored to the government’s interest in public safety.69 Instead, both courts
relied on Heller and upheld the federal law that prohibited firearm possession
by felons without defining a level of scrutiny.70 Despite this discrepancy between the instant case and the situation in the Third and Seventh Circuits, the
court in Merritt and McCoy concluded, “The felon-in-possession law, which
bans felons from possessing firearms, with no exceptions other than possessing
an antique firearm, is sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
interest of protecting the public from firearm-related crime. Therefore, it
passes strict scrutiny.”71

C. Other States’ Reliance on the Heller and McDonald Precedent
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of the Heller and
McDonald decisions addressed above differs from that of its counterparts in
other states. In Dotson and its progeny, the Supreme Court of Missouri referred
to State v. Eberhardt, a 2014 Louisiana Supreme Court case.72 Like Missouri,
Louisiana had recently amended the right to bear arms provision of its constitution to include a strict scrutiny requirement.73 In Eberhardt, the Louisiana
65. See McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812.
66. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814.
67. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011)); Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Barton,
633 F.3d at 175).
68. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897–98 (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d
681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)); Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Yancey,
621 F.3d at 685).
69. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685.
70. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685.
71. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 816. In his concurring
opinion, Judge Draper disagreed that strict scrutiny must be applied to any right to bear
arms brought under article I, section 23 as it was written prior to Amendment 5.
McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899 (Draper, J., concurring); Merritt, 468 S.W.3d at 816
(Draper, J., concurring).
72. See Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197–98 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
73. The amended version of article I, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution
states: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not
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Supreme Court upheld a statute that made it unlawful for “any person who has
been convicted of a crime of violence . . . to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.”74 This statute significantly differs from Missouri’s section
571.070.1(1).75 Not only does the Louisiana law limit criminalization to gunpossessing felons convicted of specific violent crimes, but it also does not criminalize gun possession by “any person who has not been convicted of any felony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence.”76 The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the statute survived strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling government interest of public safety.77 In holding that
the law is narrowly tailored, the court noted that it only applies to the violent
felonies enumerated in the statute, and it does not apply to individuals who
have not been convicted of a felony in the past ten years.78
Missouri and Louisiana are outliers in that their constitutions were
amended to explicitly require the application of strict scrutiny.79 Further, both
the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that,
absent their constitutional amendments, strict scrutiny would still have been

be infringed, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the
carrying of weapons concealed on the person. Any restriction on this right shall be
subject to strict scrutiny.” LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2012) (new language in
bold, deleted language struck through).
74. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1(A) (2017). The statute further defines which
“crimes of violence” were included within the statute:
a felony or simple burglary, burglary of a pharmacy, burglary of an inhabited
dwelling, unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, felony illegal use of
weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, manufacture or possession of a delayed action incendiary device, manufacture or possession of a bomb, or possession of a firearm while in the possession of or during the sale or distribution
of a controlled dangerous substance, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substances Law which is a felony, or any crime which is defined as
a sex offense in R.S. 15:541, or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one
of the above-enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been
convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any
foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state,
would be one of the above-enumerated crimes . . . .

Id. (footnote omitted).
75. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
76. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 382 (La. 2014) (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:95.1(C)).
77. Id. at 385.
78. Id.
79. State Strict Scrutiny Ballot Initiatives, EVERYTOWN (July 9, 2015), https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-strict-scrutiny/. Missouri, Louisiana, and Alabama are
the only three states to have adopted a strict scrutiny requirement for the right to bear
arms. Id. The Alabama amendment was approved in November 2014. Id.
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the applicable constitutional test for laws that limited the right to bear arms.80
Conversely, other state courts held that, in light of Heller and McDonald, strict
scrutiny is not the applicable test.81 Thus, the Supreme Court of Missouri is an
outlier in both its interpretation of Heller and McDonald and its application of
strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms. Missouri is the only state that has utilized strict scrutiny in a right to bear arms context and still upheld a law that
permanently bans all felons from possessing firearms.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State v. Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Amendment 5
did not substantially alter article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, and,
therefore, the court’s precedent that held section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict
scrutiny remained applicable to this case.82 In so holding, the court first determined that the pre-Amendment 5 version of article I, section 23 permitted regulation of firearm possession by felons.83 The court relied on its recent interpretation of the previous version of article I, section 23 in Merritt and McCoy.84
According to the court, Merritt and McCoy held that, because Heller and
McDonald recognized that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, strict
scrutiny should be used in analyzing the constitutionality of any regulation of
that right.85 The Supreme Court of Missouri did not define the exact strict
scrutiny test in Merritt, McCoy, or Clay.86 But, the Supreme Court of Missouri
80. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 n.5 (en banc) (per curiam); Eberhardt,
145 So. 3d at 383.
81. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing that
neither Heller nor McDonald applied a particular level of scrutiny, but determining that
felons convicted of violent crimes should be categorically excluded from protection
under the Second Amendment); City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644,
648 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a California state law that “authorizes the seizure
and possible forfeiture of weapons belonging to persons detained for examination . . .
because of their mental condition” did not violate the Second Amendment); Rocky
Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 371 P.3d 768, 770, ¶ 2 (Colo. App. 2016)
(noting that neither Heller nor McDonald determined a level of scrutiny for the right to
bear arms and finding a state law which “banned the sale, possession, and transfer of
‘large-capacity ammunition magazines’” constitutional).
82. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
83. Id. at 534.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., id. The court in Clay stated:
While most commonly courts apply strict scrutiny by determining whether a
law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, in other cases,
depending on the extent the regulation burdens a particular right, the courts look
to whether a regulation imposes “reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions”
that serve “the State’s important regulatory interests” or whether the encroachment is “significant.”
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held that the section 571.070.1(1) restriction on the possession of weapons by
felons survived “even the most stringent formulation of the strict scrutiny
standard in that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”87
According to the court, the State has a “compelling governmental interest in
‘ensuring public safety and reducing firearm-related crime[,] . . . [and] [p]rohibiting felons from possessing firearms is narrowly tailored to that interest
because ‘[i]t is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent
crimes than are other law abiding citizens.’”88 In concluding that section
571.070.1(1) was “narrowly tailored,” the court relied on two federal appellate
court cases, United States v. Barton and United States v. Yancey, both of which
stated that felons are more likely than non-felons to commit violent crimes.89
Next, the court held that Amendment 5 did not substantially change article I, section 23, and, therefore, the Merritt and McCoy strict scrutiny analysis
discussed above applied to the instant case.90 The court relied on its holding
in Dotson, which determined that Amendment 5 merely set out “a declaration
of the law as it would have been declared by this Court after McDonald mandated that the fundamental right to bear arms applied to the states.”91 The court
ultimately determined that Amendment 5 “sets out the standard of scrutiny for
regulation of arms possessed by persons other than convicted violent felons
and persons with certain mental disorders or infirmities – such regulations may
be adopted but will be subject to strict scrutiny.”92 Thus, the court held that
section 571.070.1(1) was constitutional under article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.93
In his dissent, Judge Teitelman wrote that section 571.070.1(1) should not
have been found constitutional under article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.94 While he agreed with the majority’s analysis that strict scrutiny
applied in determining the constitutionality of section 571.070.1(1) both before
and after the adoption of Amendment 5, he determined that “[t]he categorical
and permanent restrictions” of section 571.070.1(1) were “too broad to survive
strict scrutiny.”95 He asserted that the State did not sufficiently demonstrate

Id. at 535 (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)).
87. Id. (citing State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)).
88. Id. at 535–36 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814).
89. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897 (citing United States
v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681,
684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).
90. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536.
91. Id. (quoting Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 n.5 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(per curiam)).
92. Id. at 537.
93. Id. at 538.
94. Id. at 539 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
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that “categorically and permanently restricting the fundamental constitutional
right of nonviolent felons is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest in public safety.”96
Ultimately, Judge Teitelman provided three deficiencies in the argument
that permanently abrogating the constitutional rights of nonviolent felons to
keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and their families is narrowly
tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest of public safety.97 First, he
asserted that the studies and data offered by the State do not demonstrate that
permanently banning convicted nonviolent felons from possessing a firearm
will ameliorate any gun crime.98 He noted that the studies provided by the
State failed to differentiate between the rates and types of gun crimes committed by those with no prior convictions relative to individuals with prior nonviolent or violent convictions.99 Second, he indicated that the majority opinion
failed to properly consider that the number of nonviolent felons is growing.100
Finally, he argued that the Louisiana statute at issue in State v. Eberhardt is
“radically different” than section 571.070.1(1).101 According to Judge Teitelman, unlike section 571.070.1(1), the Louisiana statute was narrowly tailored
because it only banned possession of firearms by dangerous felons,102 and the

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. He opined:

The State does not show that any of the studies or articles separately analyzed
obvious variables such as the number and nature of the prior offenses, the number and nature of subsequent offenses, the age of the offenders, or the lapse of
time between offenses. The lack of analysis of different variables renders it
impossible to determine the relative propensity of convicted nonviolent felons
to commit gun crimes. Without this information, it is impossible to determine
whether restricting the rights of nonviolent felons is actually narrowly tailored
to achieve the goal of public safety.

Id. at 539–40.
100. Id. at 539–40. He wrote:
While it is beyond dispute that murderers, rapists and others who commit violent or dangerous felonies have amply demonstrated the inability to abide by
the responsibilities entailed by the right . . . to bear arms, that conclusion becomes considerably less certain and, in some cases, counterintuitive when one
considers the broad and ever-expanding array of nonviolent felonies.

Id. at 540–41.
101. Id. at 541.
102. Dangerous felons include only those who have been convicted of enumerated
felonies “determined by the legislature to be offenses having the actual or potential
danger of harm to other members of the general public.” State v. Eberhardt, 145 So.
3d 377, 385 (La. 2014).
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ban was not permanent but lasted ten years following completion of the sentence.103

V. COMMENT
As demonstrated above, neither Heller nor McDonald declared a specific
level of scrutiny for determining the constitutionality of laws that limit the right
to bear arms.104 By requiring strict scrutiny, Missouri actually expanded the
protection of the right to bear arms beyond the realm of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald. Judge Fischer alluded to this expansion in his concurring opinion in Dotson v. Kander.105 He noted that the
purpose of Amendment 5 to article I, section 26 was “to make sure the Missouri
Constitution is at least as protective as the Supreme Court of the United States
has declared the law of the right to bear arms is under the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution.”106
Prior to Merritt and McCoy, neither Missouri nor the federal government
had ever applied strict scrutiny to restrictions on the right to bear arms.107 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Dotson and its progeny, ultimately defined
Missouri’s standard.108 First, this Part will address the weaknesses in the Supreme Court of Missouri’s definition and application of strict scrutiny. Specifically, it will assert that section 571.070.1(1), while consistent with the Heller
dicta, cannot survive under a strict scrutiny standard. Next, this Part will recognize the inherent difficulties in applying strict scrutiny to the right to bear
arms, as well as the rationales behind and implications of the court’s use of
strict scrutiny in Clay. Ultimately, this Part will conclude that the Supreme
Court of Missouri failed to exercise the level of scrutiny required by the Missouri people and their constitution.

A. Section 571.070.1(1) Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny
While the Supreme Court of Missouri’s language is consistent with the
strict scrutiny standard, its limited analysis fails to convincingly demonstrate
that section 571.070.1(1) actually meets this high constitutional bar. Neither
103. Id.
104. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (determining

that the District of Columbia law is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny” that the Court has applied to enumerated rights). See also McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (holding that the right to bear arms is fundamental
and applies to states).
105. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 202 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Fischer, J., concurring).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. See id. (“Strict scrutiny has no settled meaning as applied to the right to bear
arms, which the Supreme Court of the United States has declared a ‘[ ]limited’ fundamental right.” (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626)).
108. See id. at 197.
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the Heller nor McDonald Courts applied a specific level of scrutiny to the right
to bear arms.109 Nevertheless, in its strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court
of Missouri relied on the Heller dicta, which determined that laws prohibiting
possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful.110 Despite the Supreme Court of Missouri’s assumption, the Heller Court’s declaration that prohibitions of firearm possession by felons are presumed lawful does not mean
that they are presumed lawful under the strict scrutiny standard.
The Clay court erred in using the more lenient constitutional standard employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to justify its upholding of section
571.070.1(1). In Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri expressed the position
that, in order to satisfy strict scrutiny, a law does not necessarily have to be
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”111 To justify its position, the Supreme Court of Missouri referred to the language used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in both Heller and Burdick v. Takushi.112 But neither the Heller
nor Burdick Courts applied a strict scrutiny test.113 As noted above, the Heller
Court deliberately did not define a specific standard of scrutiny.114 The Burdick Court expressly rejected strict scrutiny, determining that “a more flexible
standard” applied.115 This more lenient standard, quoted in the Clay opinion,
asked whether a regulation imposed “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” that served “the State’s important regulatory interests” or whether
the encroachment was “significant.”116 Because neither the Heller Court nor
the Burdick Court actually applied strict scrutiny, the Clay court erred in using
these Courts’ analyses to justify its conclusion that, to satisfy strict scrutiny, a
law does not necessarily have to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest.

109. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (determining that the District of Columbia law
is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny” that the Court has applied
to enumerated rights). See also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (holding that the right to
bear arms is fundamental and applies to states).
110. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (citing Heller, 554
U.S. at 626–27).
111. Id. The court opined:
While most commonly courts apply strict scrutiny by determining whether a
law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, in other cases,
. . . the courts look to whether a regulation imposes “reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions” that serve “the State’s important regulatory interests” or
whether the encroachment is “significant.”

Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)).
112. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992)).
113. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.
114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
115. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.
116. Id.; Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 535.
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A categorical restriction on the possession of firearms by felons cannot
survive strict scrutiny.117 Strict scrutiny is the “most rigorous and exacting
standard of constitutional review.”118 To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be
the “least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”119 The
standard can also be stated as requiring the law to be “narrowly tailored” or
“necessary” to promote the state’s “compelling interest.”120 The Supreme
Court of Missouri used the language of this standard but failed to accurately
apply the test.121
Despite the Clay court’s expression that a law need not be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest to survive strict scrutiny, the
court nevertheless relied on the Merritt and McCoy opinions to conclude that
section 571.070.1(1) survived strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.122 In Merritt and McCoy, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 571.070.1(1) survived strict scrutiny
because the state had “a compelling interest in ensuring public safety and reducing firearm-related crime.”123 In reaching the conclusion that prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms was narrowly tailored, the court relied on two
federal appellate cases, United States v. Barton124 and United States v.
Yancey.125 These cases opined that it was “well-established that felons are
more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law abiding citizens,” and
117. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009) [hereinafter
Tushnet, After Heller] (determining that a ban on possession of firearms by felons
would not survive strict scrutiny because it is “almost certainly overbroad”).
118. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)). See also Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This most exacting
standard ‘has proven automatically fatal’ in almost every case.” (quoting Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
119. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (citing United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
120. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that strict scrutiny
requires a law to be “narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”).
See also Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo.
2003) (en banc) (per curiam) (stating that strict scrutiny requires a law to be “necessary
to accomplish a compelling state interest”).
121. Post-Heller, Tushnet predicted that lower courts would uphold regulations
“reasonably analogous to the longstanding ones that the Court in Heller purported to
leave untouched” under what the courts would call “strict scrutiny,” though the test
actually applied will be a more lenient standard. Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117,
at 1428 n.13.
122. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
123. State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State
v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
124. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled by
Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016).
125. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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“someone with a felony conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon
to engage in illegal and violent gun use.”126
These appellate court cases are easily distinguished from Merritt, McCoy,
and Clay and do not support a holding that section 571.070.1(1) survives the
narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny standard. Most notably, the appellate courts followed Heller and did not apply a specific level of scrutiny.127
The Barton court relied on the Heller Court’s statement that laws prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms are “presumptively lawful” and concluded that
this restriction was “entirely consistent with the purpose of the Second Amendment to maintain ‘the security of a free State.’”128 In Yancey, the court asked
whether the government had made a “strong showing” that the challenged law
was “substantially related to an important governmental objective.”129 Nothing
in either opinion supported a conclusion that a right to bear arms restriction
would survive under the strict scrutiny test.130 Indeed, the Yancey court implied
the possibility that, under a more stringent standard, a law prohibiting felons
from possessing firearms would not survive.131 The court stated, “[W]hile
felon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‘wildly overinclusive’ for encompassing nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to consider the propriety of disarming felons under analogous state constitutional
provisions has concluded that step to be permissible.”132 Although such limitations have been found to be permissible under standards such as those performed by the Yancey and Barton courts, it seems highly unlikely that a “wildly
overinclusive” law would survive strict scrutiny.
While it might be true that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes
than non-felons, this fails to demonstrate how a law prohibiting felons from
possessing firearms is narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to promote the government’s interest. For instance, it is also true that both men and
individuals aged fifteen to twenty-four are, in general, more likely than the
general population to commit violent crimes.133 But, this does not justify restricting these classes’ right to bear arms, especially when the restriction is
evaluated under strict scrutiny. A restriction of firearm possession by felons
can be easily narrowed to achieve the interests of safety and reduction of violent crime. Most obviously, the class of all felons could be narrowed to a class

126. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (first quoting Barton,
633 F.3d at 175; and then quoting Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685).
127. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683.
128. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
129. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683.
130. Id.; Barton, 633 F.3d at 175.
131. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683.
132. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 721 (2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing]).
133. Crime and Criminal Justice, A PRIMER ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 372, 381 (2012)
(ebook), http://jsmith.cis.byuh.edu/pdfs/a-primer-on-social-problems/s11-crime-andcriminal-justice.pdf.
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of individuals who are even more likely to commit violent crimes with firearms
– violent felons.
A general ban on the possession of firearms by all felons simply is not the
least restrictive means to promote the government’s interest of public safety.
A ban on the possession of firearms by felons is almost certainly overbroad.134
There is not much evidence that indicates a convicted felon is more likely to
engage in unlawful acts with a gun than a non-felon.135 Indeed, to support the
proposition that it is “well-established that felons are more likely to commit
violent crimes than are other law abiding citizens,” the Supreme Court of Missouri merely cited to the Barton and Yancey decisions, neither of which provided strong evidence to support this assertion.136 In Barton, the Third Circuit
cited to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which found that within a population
of 234,358 federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrest for homicides
were fifty-three times the national average.137 This study is clearly outdated
and imprecise.138 In Yancey, the court specified that the “evidence of historical
precedent for prohibiting criminals from carrying arms” is frequently debated
by scholars.139 The court cited to Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory:
District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, in which Carlton F.W.
Larson asserts that prohibiting the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons
does not seem to serve the government’s interest in public safety.140 He writes,
“Why would we think that a tax evader, an embezzler, or someone who bribed
a public official would be more likely to commit acts of gun violence?”141 Larson also notes that laws permanently banning the possession of firearms by all
felons are also overbroad with respect to violent felons.142 He asserts, “Is it at
all realistic to think, say, that a ninety-two year old man, confined to a wheelchair, who committed an armed burglary in his early twenties and was released
from prison over sixty years ago, poses a realistic threat of unlawful gun violence?”143 Nevertheless, the court in Yancey concluded that the right to bear

134. Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117, at 1429.
135. Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Co-

lumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1380 (2009) (“[T]he
fit between being a convicted felon and being someone who is likely to engage in unlawful acts with a gun, although far from irrational, is not especially tight.”).
136. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535–36 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (quoting State v.
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)).
137. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled by
Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
140. Larson, supra note 135, at 1381.
141. Id. (footnotes omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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arms is “tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry,” and therefore, the government can disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”144 While the Barton and Yancey courts
held that these findings were sufficient to allow the laws to pass muster under
a lower level of scrutiny, these findings do not indicate that a permanent ban
of the possession of firearms by all felons is narrowly tailored.
Judge Teitelman expressed similar views in his dissent.145 He opined
that the State failed to present adequate evidence distinguishing between the
rate and types of gun crimes committed by those with no prior convictions relative to individuals with prior or violent convictions.146 Further, he suggested
that section 571.070.1(1) could be more narrowly tailored by limiting the
length of time for which the prohibition applies to a specific felon.147 Judge
Teitelman concluded that the “categorical and permanent restrictions that section 571.070.1 places on the exercise of this fundamental right are too broad to
survive strict scrutiny.”148
While the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on State v. Eberhardt, a Louisiana case, to justify its upholding of section 571.070.1(1), this case is inapposite to Clay.149 In fact, the Louisiana law at issue in Eberhardt exemplifies
how section 571.070.1(1) could have easily been more narrowly tailored and
less restrictive.150 The Louisiana law was not a categorical or permanent ban
on the possession of firearms for felons, which enabled the Louisiana Supreme
Court to determine that the State met its burden in satisfying strict scrutiny.151
The Eberhardt court determined
the law is narrowly tailored in its application to the possession of firearms or the carrying of concealed weapons for a period of only ten years
from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and to only those convicted of the enumerated felonies
determined by the legislature to be offenses having the actual or poten152
tial danger of harm to other members of the general public.

Conversely, section 571.070.1(1) permanently bans all felons from possessing
firearms and does not differentiate between violent and nonviolent felons.153

144. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(quoting United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010)).
145. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 541.
150. Id.
151. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 379 (La. 2014).
152. Id. at 385.
153. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). The statute states:
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Eberhardt does not justify upholding section 571.070.1(1). To the contrary,
the Louisiana statute demonstrates how section 571.070.1(1) could be more
narrowly tailored.154

B. Difficulties in Application of Strict Scrutiny to the Right to Bear
Arms
As suggested in Judge Teitelman’s dissent, and as demonstrated by the
statute at issue in State v. Eberhardt, there are many ways that section
517.070.1(1) could have been more narrowly tailored.155 However, it is inherently challenging to assess the efficacy of gun control laws, and as a result, it
is difficult for the government to meet its burden under a true strict scrutiny
standard.156 In its response to Judge Teitelman’s dissent, the Clay majority
alluded to the difficulty in applying strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms.157
The court rejected any suggestion that, “for the law to survive strict scrutiny,”
the court must “in each case de novo reconsider and itself evaluate the strength
of studies about the use of weapons by felons before it can determine whether
restrictions on the right of felons to bear arms are sufficiently narrowly tailored.”158 The court indicated that if the State were required to present convincing studies demonstrating that restricting felons from possessing firearms
actually improved public safety, it would struggle to meet its burden.159
It is, of course, inherently difficult to ascertain whether gun control laws
actually improve public safety.160 Demonstrating that a gun control law is narrowly tailored requires one to predict “(1) the possible decrease in injury and
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person
knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch person has
been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the
laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state,
would be a felony.

Id.
154. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2017).
155. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 539 (Teitelman, J., dissenting); Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d at

382.
156. See, e.g., Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117, at 1427 (“[I]n general, it is
quite difficult to show with any moderately persuasive social-science evidence that discrete and moderate gun regulations – what political candidates and public opinion surveys refer to as reasonable gun regulations – do much if anything to advance public
policies favoring reduction in violence, reduction in gun violence, reduction in accidents associated with guns, or pretty much anything else the public thinks the regulations might accomplish.”); Volokh, supra note 24, at 1465 (“The difficulty is that we
often won’t know if the proposed law is really necessary to reduce various dangers.
And this is especially true as to the right to keep and bear arms.”).
157. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536 n.5.
158. Id. at 536.
159. Id.
160. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1465.
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crime stemming from the controls and (2) the possible increase in injury and
crime stemming from the interference with lawful self-defense.”161 These are
both difficult, if not impossible, to project and calculate.162 But, the nature of
the strict scrutiny test requires some level of evidence and analysis demonstrating that the law is narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to promote
the government’s interest.163 In fact, both the Supreme Court of Missouri and
the U.S. Supreme Court have required this showing when they have applied
strict scrutiny to other various rights.164
In State v. Clay, the court erred in failing to recognize that the State did
not satisfy this burden. In determining whether section 571.070.1(1) was narrowly tailored, the court merely cited to Barton, noting that “[i]t is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., id. (“Gun control proponents argue that only banning guns, or re-

moving guns from certain places, or limiting guns in other ways will prevent certain
kinds of crimes. And they suggest that lawful self-defense isn’t really that effective, or
that it won’t be much interfered with by the proposals . . . . Gun control opponents argue
that the gun restrictions largely won’t disarm those who misuse guns, since the misusers
are criminals who won’t comply with gun laws any more than they comply with laws
banning robbery, rape, or murder. And they argue that any possible slight decline in
injuries caused by people who do comply with gun laws, or in accidental injuries or in
suicides . . . will be more than offset by the increase in crime and injury stemming from
lost opportunities for effective self-defense.” (footnote omitted)). For a more comprehensive version of this debate, see Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011).
163. Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 162, at 438–39.
164. See, e.g., In re Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (determining that a law which required secure confinement of sexually violent predators was
narrowly tailored because the state “erect[ed] an elaborate, step-by-step procedure, conferring on the suspected predator a number of rights enjoyed by defendants in criminal
prosecutions” and mandated annual court examinations to “determine if the person’s
mental abnormality has improved with treatment and if the individual remains likely to
engage in violent sexual acts if released”), modified (Jan. 27, 2004); Weinschenk v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that provision requiring
photo identification to vote was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in preventing voter fraud because “[n]o evidence was presented that voter impersonation fraud exists to any substantial degree in Missouri. In fact, the evidence that
was presented indicates that voter impersonation fraud is not a problem in Missouri”).
See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (holding that a law requiring a female member of the uniformed services to prove dependency in fact to receive
benefits for her spouse, where no such burden was imposed upon male members, required the government to demonstrate concrete evidence that “it is actually cheaper to
grant increased benefits with respect to all male members, than it is to determine which
male members are in fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only
to those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement” in order to
survive strict scrutiny (emphasis added)).
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abiding citizens.”165 Further, the court opined that 571.070.1(1) was narrowly
tailored in that it “does not apply to misdemeanors, felony convictions that
have been pardoned, or possession of antique firearms.”166 Because the State
failed to show evidence indicating that a categorical and permanent restriction
of firearm possession by felons actually increases public safety, the court
should have held section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional.

C. The Rationale Behind and Implications of the Clay Decision
Most laws do not survive under a strict scrutiny standard.167 But, a court
striking down a restriction of the right to bear arms can result in substantial
consequences that do not typically occur when other laws restricting fundamental rights are declared unconstitutional. For example, had the Supreme
Court of Missouri declared section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional, then all felons would have the legal ability to possess firearms until the Missouri legislature passed a law that was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.168 But, the potentially unsettling aftermath of declaring section
571.070.1(1) unconstitutional does not exempt the State from having to meet
its burden, nor does it exempt the court from fulfilling its responsibility to strike
down unconstitutional laws.
Because declaring 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional would have allowed
all felons, including violent felons, to possess firearms for at least a short period of time, the approach taken by the court was likely motivated by its desire
to avoid this policy result. But, this approach failed to embody the rigorous
strict scrutiny standard. As Justice Breyer predicted in his Heller dissent, this
analysis was, in practice, akin to an interest-balancing inquiry, where the Court
asked whether “the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent
that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important
governmental interests.”169 The finding that felons were more likely to commit
165. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)).
166. Id. at 536.
167. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (“Overall,
30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny – nearly one in three – result in the challenged law being upheld.”).
168. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 326 (2003) (stating that strict scrutiny
requires a law to be narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest). See
also Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc) (per curiam) (stating that strict scrutiny requires a law to be “necessary to
accomplish a compelling state interest”).
169. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the adoption of a true strict
scrutiny standard for evaluating gun-control regulation would be impossible. Id. He
opined:

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 14

618

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

violent crimes than “other law abiding citizens” proved a compelling interest
to restrict firearm possession by felons – an interest that is likely not overcome
by its “burden” on the right to bear arms.170 Thus, while the State could not
sufficiently prove that section 571.070.1(1) is narrowly tailored, it did convince
the majority in Clay that the state’s compelling interest in public safety outweighs the right of felons to bear arms.171
Despite the Heller majority’s explicit rejection of the interest-balancing
test,172 analysis of the majority’s decision in State v. Clay indicates that the
attempt to apply a high standard of scrutiny to a law restricting the right to bear
arms may actually morph into an interest-balancing inquiry.173 On the other
hand, had the Supreme Court of Missouri properly applied strict scrutiny, then,
for the reasons outlined above, it would have found that the State failed to meet
its burden because there was insufficient evidence showing that a permanent
firearm ban for all felons was narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
public safety interest.
By failing to properly apply strict scrutiny, the court defied the clear language of the constitution, as well as its duty to declare the statute unconstitutional.174 The court attempted to justify its upholding of section 571.070.1(1)
under strict scrutiny by citing to its determination that Amendment 5 did not
“substantially change” article I section 23.175 In their Dotson concurrences,
both Judge Fischer and Judge Stith stated that the authors of Amendment 5,
which included the Missourians Protecting the Second Amendment, merely

[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the
Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns
on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.

Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536.
Id.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
See, e.g., Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 162, at 446–47 (“[T]he historical
acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions cannot be explained by anything other than
this very type of interest-balancing – an approach that does not require the kind of compelling empirical evidence of necessity that the strict scrutiny test demands.”).
174. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to
suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.”).
175. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536 (citing Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 190 (Mo.
2015) (en banc) (per curiam)).
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wanted to “ensure that the Missouri right to keep and bear arms remains coextensive with the federal right explicated in Heller and McDonald.”176 But, the
authors of Amendment 5 undoubtedly desired the greatest protection of the
right to bear arms possible and recognized that the “strict scrutiny” language
would increase the protection of the right.177 The Missourians Protecting the
Second Amendment website notes that, prior to the addition of Amendment 5,
Missouri’s right to bear arms provision was “deemed to only deserve a ‘rational
basis’ or the lowest standard of review – virtually any rights-infringing law can
pass this level of review.”178 Thus, with their approval of Amendment 5, Missourians called for the application of the most exacting standard of review for
laws restricting the right to bear arms.179
It seems, though, that the court had reason to fail to exercise the power
given to them by the people. First, as addressed above the court must have
recognized that declaring section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional would, at least
for a period of time, allow all felons to possess firearms, including those who
committed the most violent crimes. Further, in Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, Adam Winkler notes that when courts apply a true strict scrutiny standard
for laws restricting the right to bear arms, “legislatures may be hesitant to undertake their duty to enhance public safety by regulating weapons out of fear
that strict scrutiny will in fact be fatal.”180 He states, “Even if legislatures know
that some laws survive Second Amendment strict scrutiny, the expected bene-

176. Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 202 (Fischer, J., concurring); see also id. at 206–07
(Stith, J., concurring) (noting that Amendment 5 “was not intended to change the current state of the law regarding the right to carry or to regulate concealed weapons but
was intended only to codify that law”). The court seems to read Amendment 5 in a way
that makes it pure surplusage. Id. at 210. This violates an important canon of statutory
interpretation – the principle that each word in a statute is meaningful, and thus, “an
interpretation that would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be
rejected.” Katharine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and
Applying Statutes, WRITING CTR. AT GEO. U. L. CTR. 6 (Apr. 2006),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf. See also Matthew Davis,
Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2016) (“Ideally,
‘every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute’ should be given effect.” (quoting 801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc))).
177. MISSOURIANS PROTECTING 2ND AMEND., http://www.morkba.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (encouraging constituents to support Amendment 5 because it
“[a]dds ‘strict scrutiny’ which is the highest level of legal protection for a constitutional
right”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note 132, at 731.
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fits of gun control would be discounted by the probability of judicial invalidation.”181 The court avoids these potentially problematic implications by circumventing a true strict scrutiny application and declining to declare section
571.070.1(1) unconstitutional.182
The court’s faulty application of strict scrutiny is concerning. Dotson and
its progeny will undoubtedly serve as precedent for future challenges to laws
restricting the right to bear arms in Missouri. Thus, despite the language of the
Missouri Constitution requiring laws restricting the right to bear arms to be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, the court will
continue to uphold laws that in reality fail to meet this standard. Possibly more
concerning, it is probable that the court’s erroneous application of strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms may lead to the loose application of strict scrutiny
to laws that undermine other fundamental rights. Should this occur, laws limiting fundamental rights will be upheld under the strict scrutiny standard
merely because there is a compelling government interest,183 despite the state’s
failure to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored.

VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared constitutional a
law that prohibited felons from possessing firearms – a Second Amendment
restriction that has historically been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, lower
federal courts, and state courts. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in
Clay differed from that of other courts, however, in that the Supreme Court of
Missouri found this law constitutional, even under a strict scrutiny standard.
While the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding is seemingly consistent with
the intentions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Missouri legislature, it is arguably inconsistent with the Missouri Constitution’s true meaning and the will
of the people of Missouri. In failing to properly apply strict scrutiny, the court
evaded its duty to serve as a check on the legislative branch and strike down
legislation that impinges upon the people’s constitutional rights.184
To carry out the role demanded by the Framers185 and preserve the meaning of the most exacting standard of constitutional review, the court should
have properly applied strict scrutiny and declared section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional. The court could have declared the law unconstitutional while also
avoiding the potential problematic policy implications addressed above. For
example, in declaring section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional, the court could
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 534–35 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to
suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.”).
185. Id.
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have provided suggestions of laws that are narrowly tailored. For instance, the
Louisiana law at issue in State v. Eberhardt is as an example of a properly
tailored felon-in-possession statute.186 Additionally, declaring the statute unconstitutional “as applied” to Clay, a nonviolent felon, was another option for
the court. This would have avoided a facial declaration of unconstitutionality
and preserved the restrictions on all felons until the Missouri legislature passed
a new law. These alternatives would have allowed the court to fulfill its duty
under the constitution, while avoiding potential negative policy implications.
Instead, the court chose an option that left unclear the proper application of the
strict scrutiny standard to laws restricting the right to bear arms and ultimately
flouted the language of the constitution.

186. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 381 (La. 2014).
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